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Abstract: In our study, we analyse data from the Hungarian Microcensus (2016) in order to map
the proportion of Hungarian jobs threatened by the spread of automation. In doing so, we use
the internationally well-known methodology of Carl Benedict Frey and Michael A. Osborne who
estimated the probability of computerization for 702 occupations. The analysis was then repeated by
Panarinen and Rouvinen for the Finnish labour market by converting the probabilities defined for
the US occupational statistics to the European International Standard Classification of Occupations.
Similar calculations were conducted for the Swedish and Norwegian labour markets. According
to our results, almost every second Hungarian employee (44%) works in a job that is threatened
by the development of digital technologies. The same ratio is 47% in the US and 53% in Sweden,
while it is much lower in Finland (35%) and Norway (33%). It is especially alarming that 13% of the
Hungarian workforce (i.e., almost 600,000 employees) works in an occupation where the probability
of computerization is above 95%, while the number of those working in occupations where the
same ratio is above 90% exceeds one million (i.e., 25% of the total Hungarian labour force). Diving
deeper into the analysis, we can state that those with higher educational qualifications are more
likely to work in an occupation that is more protected against computerization. Overall, there are
no significant differences in the probability of computerization by gender; however, women are
over-represented in the most endangered occupations.
Keywords: automation; labour market; occupation; Hungary
1. Introduction: Industrial Revolutions in the Context of the Technical–Technological
Paradigm Shift
Although there is widespread agreement in both professional and public discourse
that technological developments will result in massive economic and social changes, there
is some degree of uncertainty regarding how many industrial revolutions will occur over
the next few decades. Jeremy Rifkin [1–3] argued that we are at the dawn of the third
industrial revolution that will be marked by the integration of emerging communication
technologies and renewable energy regimes. Klaus Schwab, executive chairman of the
World Economic Forum, spoke of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in a voluminous re-
port [4] (five years later claiming that it differs from previous revolutions in speed, width,
depth, and regarding the systemic nature of change). Carlota Perez [5] provided a more
comprehensive historical analysis of the characteristics of industrial revolutions, suggesting
that the fifth industrial revolution has been unfolding since the 1970s. Her work is worth
closer attention considering that over the course of her decades of study, she has discovered
remarkable parallels in the structure of the previous technological revolutions.
The first common point is that innovation has been the primary catalyst of funda-
mental economic and social change. In general, it is not a question of a single technology
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emerging but of the simultaneous growth of technical innovations that seem to be dis-
tinctly different from one another, in addition to their interconnection and integration
beyond a certain point of development. Perez also discovered remarkable parallels in the
progression of industrial revolutions over time that she divided into three main internal
stages. According to this, emerging technologies are developing at a rapid pace but in
absence of a clear path in the early stages of recovery and actors are sensing the potential
of innovations intuitively rather than understanding intellectually. The role of the state
in this phase is characterized by deregulation in this process to break down barriers to
technological growth and encourage capital inflow into innovation. This method may be
compared to blowing bubbles of expectation that sooner or later burst or in some cases
be superseded and merged into a new bubble. This is often how the second stage of an
industrial revolution begins, marked by a series of crises. The state will regain its dominant
role in the third post-crisis phase of the the so-called deployment period, establishing a
new regulatory environment, providing some guidance to the rapidly converging technical
innovations1, and shaping the determinants of the new growth model.
We do not intend to scrutinize Perez’s historical accuracy; rather, we embrace it as a
general context of understanding within which the subject of digitization and automation
can be framed. In this context, we are now in a digital age experiencing a crisis that differs
from past industrial revolution crises in that it lasts longer and currently has had at least
two culminating points: the first was the collapse of the dot-com bubble at the turn of
the millennium and the second was the financial crisis and economic recession triggered
by the U.S. real estate sector. In addition, the first was fuelled by unrealistic expectations
for advances in information and communication technology according to Perez and the
second was centred on the convergence of these technologies into the real estate and
banking sectors that have increased the likelihood for bubbles to form as the regulatory
requirements for financial institutions were eased. However, with the convergence of
other factors including the public health and socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 and
ever-increasing pressure to address climate and environmental challenges [6–8], we are
most interested in what kind of world could emerge following these overlapping crises,
particularly at the scale of the roughly ten million people living in Hungary.
For our analysis, we begin with the acknowledgement that digital technologies such
as artificial intelligence, robots, sensors, the Internet of Things, algorithmic management,
and so on are gaining ground in an increasing range of industrial and service activities
from production through logistics to after-sales services. In our research, we examine the
percentage of Hungary’s jobs that are threatened by automation in the near future. To do
so, we (1) examine the potential labour market consequences of automation, (2) review
attempts to quantify susceptibility to automation, (3) present our calculations for Hungary,
and (4) contextualize our findings in the context of international research and current
theoretical approaches.
The scientific community has expressed considerable concern about the social conse-
quences of each of the technical–economic paradigm changes. Concerns about automation
have existed as of the 18th century [6,9,10]. These problems are divided into four categories:
1. Analyses that attempt to predict the job-destroying impact of digitalization in the short
and medium term receive the most coverage [11–14]. The number of calculations,
methodologies, and countries studied follow a broad and varied trend, ranging from
9% to 47% of jobs that could be lost due to automation in the next several decades.
We will examine this issue in more detail below.
2. We also find a substantial body of literature that attempts to capture the impact
on the labour market of emerging technologies by tracking shifts in the skill level
demand in the labour market rather than focusing on aggregate losses. In this regard,
the literature contains two narratives that are partly overlapping and contradictory.
The first focuses on educational attainment and the second explores the degree
of routine content of work tasks in jobs that will have the highest susceptibility
level to automation (i.e., which are most susceptible and at risk). According to the
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skill-biased technological change (SBTC) theory, the spread of ICT tools will mostly
eliminate low-skilled jobs, while higher-skilled jobs will not be affected or will increase
directly in numbers [15]. In contrast, the theory of routine-biased technological
change (RBTC) states that digital technologies primarily threaten jobs that have a
high routine content regardless of whether it is cognitive or manual work as these
tasks can be easily codified, programmed, and replaced by algorithms [16]. The
first theory is a technology-optimistic scenario in which a general increase in ability
levels is implicitly predicted, while the second theory is technology-pessimistic as it
envisions a worsening of skill polarization as digital technology advances. Growing
employment is expected at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy (jobs requiring
manual and empathic-emotional skills but with low prestige) and at the top (jobs
requiring high abstraction skills but with high prestige), while in the middle (routine
cognitive or manual occupations) hollowing out is considered.
3. Faced with the social consequences of technological transition, the most pessimistic
theory predicts the immediate end of jobs at least in the sense they have been defined
in over recent centuries [3]. This theory is based on the implicit assumption that
the number of available jobs is finite, implying that the more jobs that utilize digital
technology, the less work there is for people, but the record of the past two decades
runs counter to this assumption. Rifkin, who expected a drop in jobs, was mistaken
with employment increasing steadily between 1995 and 2015 despite the fact that two
serious crises occurred during this period [6] (p. 3). Nonetheless, similar predictions
emerge from time to time; for example, some proponents of a universal basic income
rely on this assumption.
4. Finally, while it receives less coverage, a fourth area of concern is the impact of
the digital revolution on working practices and conditions. Longer working hours,
increased work intensity, work–life balance disruption, and further softening of
conventional employment relationships are all negative consequences of increased job
flexibility in this context. In contrast, some researchers argue that digital technology
and robots will liberate workers from monotonous and dehumanizing physical work,
thus raising the overall intellectual content of the work experience. Both effects
are likely to occur; the question is to what extent. Even the earliest studies on
platform work emphasize that digital technologies simultaneously allow for digital
precariousness to experience substandard working conditions while also allowing
highly skilled software engineers to choose when, how much, and what kind of work
they want to do based on their own preferences [17].
While all four of these overlapping challenges are important to consider, we confine
our investigation here to the first.
2. Data and Materials
As previously mentioned, several studies have been conducted to estimate the possible
effects of automation2 on jobs. Different in terms of methods and findings obtained,
these analyses can be divided into two main groups with some simplification. Some of
them calculate an automation susceptibility multiplier3 by analysing the characteristics of
occupations, then estimating the population within the labour force based on the proportion
of the employees in jobs that are at risk by the deployment of new technologies. Others
attempt to calculate susceptibility to automation based on the content of specific job tasks.
The value of learning and creative skills in the work process, the role of manual dexterity
at work, the degree of employee autonomy, and the network of social interactions are all
variables that are considered.
In our present analysis, we deploy the first approach of analysing the characteristics of
occupations and estimating the population at risk. We draw upon the previous research of
Oxford authors Carl Benedict Frey and Michael A. Osborne whose influential 2017 research
study received almost 7000 citations up to 22 October 2020, although their first results
were already published in 2013 [1,11]. As it is one of the most prominent papers of the last
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decade and has inspired a number of new studies and analyses, we use their approach to
examine the Hungarian context. The theoretical starting point is Autor and Acemoglu’s [18]
work which stated that the routineness of work tasks is a determining factor in terms of
its susceptibility to automation. A two-by-two matrix was created with four types of
work tasks: routine cognitive tasks, non-routine cognitive tasks, routine manual tasks, and
non-routine manual tasks. It is important to keep in mind that when authors state, “routine
tasks”, they do not necessarily mean “boring” or “down-to-earth” but rather “well-defined,
predictable” tasks that are easier to programme and automate. In fact, we revert to Mihály
Polányi who distinguished between easily (1) codifiable, explicit knowledge and (2) private
and tacit or hidden, secret knowledge that cannot be revealed or expressed in writing [16].
Job activities based primarily on the former type of knowledge are programmed and then
performed by machines rather than humans in the digitization process. While these are
mostly repetitive manual and cognitive activities, Frey and Osborne claim that recent
technological advancements have resulted in substantial change in other areas as well.
This is due to the ability to automate non-routine cognitive and manual activities using
technologies such as big data, machine learning, sensors, and mobile robots.
The authors support their point with already existing working examples from the
fields of health, law, transportation, and agriculture. What is essential for the reconstruction
of the argument is that, according to Frey and Osborne, technological advancement creates
new fracture lines in the determination of the susceptibility to automation. The previous
dividing line between routine and non-routine has become obsolete. Frey and Osborne,
in contrast, have found three engineering bottlenecks in job automation that in place of
routine are substantial obstacles to replacing human labour by machines that are as follows:
• Tasks that require perception and manipulation. Programming a task requires a
well-structured work environment with a small number of variables. Many of these
operations will benefit from these conditions including logistics warehouses, hospitals,
stores, factories, and so on. Most of them are, for example, designed to allow wheeled
vehicles and thus robots to move freely but this is difficult or impossible in many
other cases (e.g., a construction site). Currently, robots are not better than humans at
perceiving and dealing with unforeseen, unexpected events.
• Tasks that require creative intelligence. While artificial intelligence and related digital
programming can handle many tasks, we have not yet progressed far enough in re-
searching the psychology of creativity to be able to transplant it into automated processes.
• Tasks that require social intelligence. As part of our employment, we are inevitably
involved in a variety of situations involving social interactions with our colleagues,
clients, and other partners in which we must use a variety of social skills such as
negotiation, persuasion, empathy, and care-giving. Although robotics is progressing
in this field as well, we are still a long way from mass-producing robots that recognize
human emotions and can respond to them appropriately.
Frey and Osborne used the so-called O*NET database that included job descriptions
for 903 occupations to estimate the susceptibility of each occupation to automation in
the United States. These descriptions were created with the help of labour practitioners,
experts, and employees. This database has been applied to the US Department of Labour’s
database of 702 occupations to gain access to salary data and other characteristics of a
profession (on the methodology for aggregation and aggregation of certain occupations
see Reference: Frey–Osborne [1] (pp. 262–265). This was followed by a workshop with
machine learning experts from Oxford University’s Faculty of Mechanical Engineering,
discussing how they observe each job being automated at the current technological stage.
Each of the 702 jobs was given a value between 0 and 1 at the end of an analytic procedure
that combined qualitative and quantitative methodological elements to estimate their
susceptibility to automation, with 0 denoting the lowest exposure and 1 denoting the
maximum. The occupations were then categorized into three groups: low, medium, and
high risk. Low risk occupations had a value below 0.3, medium risk occupations received
a value between 0.3 and 0.7, and a value above 0.7 was assigned to high-risk occupations.
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The result is well-known and has elicited a strong response in the United States: nearly
half of the population (47%) works in occupations with a susceptibility to automation of
more than 0.7, indicating they are more likely to be automated and thus human labour will
be replaced by machines in the next two decades. Employees in positions with medium
and low risk to automation account for 19% and 33% of the workforce, respectively. We do
not want to include a systematic analytical critique of the technique outlined in a somewhat
simplified manner above in this article. Instead, we focus on only two points. The first
is that while the researchers attempted to begin with a summary of job task descriptions
relevant to occupations, they did so in an abstract manner: they worked from labour
statistics manuals rather than from individual employee’s specific work tasks4. However,
the unit of analysis has moved from specific work tasks to individual occupations; thus,
findings are difficult to interpret. The second point stems in part from this as it is difficult
to imagine that the same profession covers the same job tasks particularly in a country
as geographically large and culturally diverse as the United States. In comparison, it is
reasonable to conclude that the same occupation in a small rural business entails a radically
different form of work activity than in a plant of a cosmopolitan city where the division
of labour is much more differentiated than the ad hoc work organization for smaller
businesses.
As previously mentioned, the study was first published in 2013 and inspired the
work of other researchers including Pajarinen and Rouvinen who conducted the same
research in 2014 on Finnish occupational data from 2011 [2]. A year later, with the in-
volvement of a staff member from the Statistical Office of Norway, results were compared
with the Norwegian data for 2013 [19]. This involved a methodological challenge as the
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) of the United States had to be matched to
its European equivalent, the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO).
This necessitated further compromises, resulting in 410 cases in Finland and 374 in the
case of Norway. Nonetheless, the narrowed sample was essentially the same as the total
employment for both countries [ibid] (p. 4). The authors also calculated the results using
2012 US data to overcome comparability issues caused by the time variations in databases.
As compared to the United States, the two Scandinavian countries exhibited significant
differences in susceptibility to automation. Although the proportion of employees in
high-risk occupations in the United States increased to 49% in 2012 from the 47% of two
years prior, the same proportion was 35% in Finland and 33% in Norway. The researchers
attributed the difference to two key factors. The first is in occupational structure: Although
the two northern European countries displayed substantial similarities in this regard, the
same could not be said for the United States. The second explanatory factor is that of
methodology: As previously stated, there were trade-offs in the matching of job categories
used in the United States and Europe, and aggregations usually took the arithmetic mean
of susceptibility to automation into account that inevitably contributed to a rise in the
proportion of occupations with medium risk. The researchers also measured U.S. data by
categorizing ISCO to mitigate this “centring.” While the result was slightly lower (45%),
the difference was still important. Stefan Fölster, similar to his Finnish and Norwegian
colleagues, used this methodology to calculate the percentage of employees in Sweden who
worked in occupations with a high susceptibility to automation (p > 0.7), indicating that
according to the above methodology, 53% of employees in Sweden work in occupations
with a risk of becoming obsolete in the next two decades [20] (p. 11). The main reason for
the surprisingly high value according to the author may be that a higher proportion of the
Swedish labour force works in sector, which are highly susceptible to automation.
3. Results: Susceptibility to Automation in Hungary
Fruzsina Nábelek and Eszter Vági [21] examined the evolution of susceptibility to
automation in Hungary. Their research is largely focused on Frey and Osborne’s method-
ology that aims to assess susceptibility based on the automation probabilities of various
occupations. Unlike the classifications used in international studies, they assigned probabil-
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ity values to each FEOR code5 on their own based on a keyword analysis of the definition
of each occupation. Then, based on the degree of susceptibility to automation, five classes
were created with 18% and 9% of employees performing work that includes entirely non-
automated or mainly non-automated subtasks, respectively, while 28, 15, and 4% are
composed of partially, mostly, or fully automated subtasks.
To ensure that our findings are internationally comparable, we use the methodology
established by Frey and Osborne and refined by Pajarinen and Rouvinen, retaining the
probabilities used in Frey and Osborne’s original work. For our purposes, the first step
was to convert the automation probabilities associated with occupations to the FEOR08
nomenclature. We used Pajarinen and Rouvinen’s ISCO-based probabilities6 for this. As
a result, a translation work for SOC and ISCO was conducted. As the FEOR is based on
ISCO, there was less ambiguity in the translation in this case: the vast majority of four-digit
ISCO and FEOR codes are clearly compatible7. However, there have been cases (40) where
a FEOR code was linked to multiple ISCO codes with varying automation probabilities. In
these cases, we used the average of the probabilities associated with the various ISCO codes
in an approach similar to Pajarinen and Rouvinen’s method8. Three FEOR occupations,
in contrast, did not have an automation probability and in these situations we averaged
the automation probabilities of jobs in the same occupational subgroup (three-digit FEOR
code). We have data on the occupation of over 99% of employees due to these procedures.
In the following section we make an estimate of the level of susceptibility to automation in
Hungary based on the baseline data of the 2016 microcensus9.
According to our research, 44% of Hungarian employees had a job in 2016 that was
highly susceptible to automation based on the 70% threshold set by Frey and Osborne. This
figure is marginally lower than the results for the United States but substantially higher
than Finland’s 35% and Norway’s 33% (see Table 1).
Table 1. The aggregated indicators of susceptibility to automation in the examined countries.
Country Automation Susceptibility * Year of Analysed Data
Sweden 53% N/A




Source: authors’ own editing. * indicates the proportion of the labour force as of total employed population
who work in jobs where p > 0.7 in Frey and Osborne’s methodology. ** indicates that to improve the quality of
comparability, we used the U.S. indicator counted from ISCO codes by Pajarinen et al. [19].
Overall, the Hungarian metrics of susceptibility to automation are in the higher ranges
in the international comparison; they are roughly on par with those of the United States but
lag behind those of Sweden and are significantly higher than those in Finland and Norway.
From several aspects, the data in Hungary are close to the findings of previous
studies when considering the distribution of workers according to the probability of
automation (See Figures 1–3 that illustrates the employee distribution by the 5th percentile.)
Accordingly, the majority of employees in each country are concentrated at the two extremes
of the distribution. As a result, while many jobs are not threatened by automation, there is
still a large proportion of jobs whose risk of being automated are close to 100% and may
thus be directly and in the short term at risk of being affected by technological change. As a
domestic feature, Hungary, like Sweden and the United States, has a high proportion of the
most vulnerable groups: 13% of workers or nearly 600,000 have a job with a likelihood of
automation of 95% or higher, and the number of those with a 90% higher chance of being
automated has surpassed one million, accounting for nearly a quarter of all employees.
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Figure 3. Breakdown of employees by susceptibility to automation and gender per person in 2016. Source: Microcensus 2016.
In the following section, we examine how susceptibility to automation changes in
Hungary according t different socioeconomic factors. In each of the cou tries surveyed,
differences in ducation l attai ment are identical and Nábelek and Vági’s analyses reveal
the same correlation . The higher a person’s education level, the more li ly th y a e to
work in a field that is less susceptible to automation. Although only 14% f people with a
tert ary ducation are considered at risk, this proportion rises to more than two thirds for
those with a primary education (see Figure 1 below). However, the differences in results
between Finland and Norway compared to Hungary in terms of the level of susceptibility
to automation can almost certainly be explained by this factor. While the proportion of
occupations that require a high level of education is especially high in Finland and Norway,
the proportion of occupations that do not require a high level of education is particularly
low. In Hungary, the situation is reversed [22–24]. It is also worth noting that a high level of
education alone does not protect jobs against automation; it only does so if it is combined
with creative work and the correlation is not obvious for a low level of education. Routine
intellectual work requiring a high level of education is at risk of being more susceptible to
automation than care-giving work is with a lower level of education that requires a high
degree of empathy and emotional ability.
As it is shown in Figure 2, there are also significant variations by industry. Employees
in agriculture (69%) and industry (61%) are the most susceptible to automation, whereas
service workers (31%) are less vulnerable. Different segments of the occupational structure
can have different explanations for these variations. Consider, the service sector has a
high proportion of administrative and intellectual occupations that require a high level
of qualification and responsibility, as well as occupations that require the employee’s
personal presence or customized service. This similarity can also be seen in Finland but the
variations between sectors are smaller in Norway.
When considering the gender differences, we discover that the proportion of men
and women in the groups at risk is nearly identical (slightly higher for men at 45% and
slightly lower for women at 43%) but the size of the low-susceptible group is significantly
larger among women and the mean is significantly higher among men (see Figure 3 below).
These findings are similar to those in Finland where the gender distribution in the at-risk
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community is both similar and different from the Norwegian study where the proportion of
men is significantly higher. The high proportion of women in the low-risk group is because
many occupations traditionally filled by women in Hungary and elsewhere are difficult
to automate, particularly in the fields of education, training, nursing, and care-giving.
The gender ratio in the highly susceptible community is similar but there are significant
inequalities within the group. Women make up nearly 80% of the workforce in the most
susceptible (96–100%) occupations and in the 91st–95th percentile their ratio is 55%, while
in the 71st–90th percentile, men account for the majority. Women are perceived to be at
high risk within the susceptible category as the threat of automation disproportionately
affects repetitive routine cognitive occupations such as secretary, clerk, and cashier jobs
that are primarily filled in by women.
Regional variations in susceptibility to automation represent differences in occupa-
tional structure. In Budapest and the central region, the proportion of higher-status and
higher-skilled professions is much higher but a lower proportion of workers are at risk.
The other regions have no major differences in susceptibility to automation. See in detail in
Figure 4!
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Figure 4. Breakdown of low, medium, and highly susceptible groups to automation by gender,
educational attainment, industry, and region in percentage in 2016. Source: Microcensus 2016.
Note: According to international examples, those with high susceptibility were considered to be
p > 70 and those with low susceptibility were considered to be p < 30.
The breakdown of Hungarian data by socio-demographic characteristics reveals that
women are in the majority in both the most susceptible (especially in the 96th–100th per-
centile) and relatively more secure (p < 0,3) occupations. Simultaneously, the susceptibility
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to automation decreases with the level of education. Regarding regional differences, we
have discovered that a higher proportion of the population of Budapest were employed in
more secure occupations, while no significant differences between the other regions of the
country were found.
Finally, we provide some theoretical, methodological, and practical guidance on how
to interpret these data in the following section.
4. Discussion: Is There a Cause for Concern?
The anxiety that technological advancements, mechanization, and in particular au-
tomation would put employment at risk has been a constant if not evolving theme as of
the first industrial revolution [10]. Data from the United States calculated using Frey and
Osbourne’s methodology have sparked widespread interest among social scientists as well
as the general public. The automation literature contains certain implicit presuppositions
that are more or less common to all that restricts the accuracy of projections based on these
assumptions, which can be traced back in some way to technological determinism and can
be summarized as follows:
• The impacts of automation on employment are being assessed under unchanged social
and market conditions. Predictions on automation estimate what effects technological
advancements will have on the labour market within a decade or two by ensuring that
all other variables remain constant in the extrapolation. If in the future robots perform
a large portion of human work, communities will naturally react as technology, its
work organization, and the overall social environment are evolving together. The same
is true of market conditions: As production costs decline, prices will fall, allowing
demand to rise, as observed with many commodities in the past. For example, as the
textile industry became industrialized in the 19th century, it greatly decreased prices,
resulting in increased demand that in turn increased labour demand until the number
of textile workers in the United States reached 400,000 by 1940. However, after that, the
market became saturated, prices and profitability began to decline, and globalization
emerged, as only 20,000 employees remain in this industry today. The automobile
and steel industries have experienced similar inverse U-shaped employment effects.
In these industries, automation has resulted in a temporary increase in employment,
whereas job-destroying effects have only been felt in the long run [25] (pp. 5–7). In
this regard, it is important to note not only the elasticity of the demand side of product
markets but also the versatility of the supply side of the labour market (i.e., how
quickly large numbers of people can respond to changing skill requirements and
other labour market demand side automation conditions are important factors [2016]).
Factors in determining how fully processes are automated are complex and over-
automation is a possibility according to the experience of a German automotive case
study [26]; for example, in the case of the family business in question, production
processes were automated to the point that the level of flexibility they had previously
been able to adapt to the rapidly changing needs of demand was lost. By integrating
mechanization with a “clever use of manual human labour”, there was a consensus
to reduce the level of automation and return mechanization to the flexibility of the
production process [27]). In general, most analyses on the effects of automation on
jobs focus exclusively on labour cost reduction, while other positive effects (higher
quality, better planning, and more sophisticated logistic systems) are not included.
However, they affect changes in demand, for example.
• Previous automation experiences do not apply to the employment effects of digital
technologies; instead, something completely new emerges. Past forecasts of the
end of the world of work have thus far proven to be premature and the number of
workers participating in the globalizing labour market continues to grow. In contrast
to previous leaps in technological growth, one of the most important novelties of the
industrial revolution is machine learning that opens new dimensions to automation.
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In any case, history indicates that technological revolutions have not only decreased
but also increased the demand for labour.
• The number of jobs that people can perform is finite, indicating that the more we auto-
mate, the less job opportunities there are. This argument is closely coupled to the first
point concerning when the results of automation are estimated to be constant under all
other circumstances. In such conditions, it is still possible to forecast how many jobs
technological advancements will save but projecting credible assumptions regarding
what new industries will emerge as a result of the growth of digital technology is
difficult. It was impossible to foresee how the advent of telegraphy would impact
the stock market or even sports betting in the 19th century. We are similarly puzzled
as to what new industries will emerge from the current development. According
to Perez, the structure of industrial revolutions has caused drastic changes in daily
life: it was inconceivable during the Great Depression of the 1930s that most people
living in deep urban poverty would drive from their suburban homes to work in just
two decades. Instead of the industry-based metropolitan lifestyles of the Victorian
era, a suburban lifestyle was developed [28].10 As a result, most automation research
largely excludes employment enhancing impacts and focuses exclusively on negative
job consequences, which is understandable considering that it is difficult to foresee
whether new goods, services, or jobs will arise from social transformations of digital
technology in the future.
• Non-automation may also have a destroying effect on employment even more so than
automation. There are few better examples of the one-way mechanism of technolog-
ical determinism than failing to take advantage of the opportunities of automation.
Another flaw with automation analyses is that they are unable to predict the job-
destroying consequences of businesses that do not take advantage of the efficiency
gains provided by technological development.
In addition to the theoretical shortcomings mentioned above, there are a few method-
ological obstacles that can help determine how significant the job destroying impacts
of automation are. As previously stated, studies of the impact of automation on jobs
usually employ two methodologies or a combination of them. The findings suggest that
the methodology used has a substantial influence on how drastic changes are predicted:
Occupational-based approaches have a greater impact than approaches based on the
content of specific job tasks (see Table 2).
Table 2. Findings of the most important studies on automation.
Authors Level of Analysis Source of Data Main Findings
Frey and Osborne (2013) jobs US Bureau of LabourStatistics USA: 47% of jobs are directly susceptible
Arntz, Gregory, and
Zierahn (OECD, 2016) work task PIACC, 21 countries
USA: 9% of jobs are susceptible. In OECD-member
countries, the extent of susceptibility is between 6%
(Korea) and 12% (Germany).
Nedelkoska and
Quintini (OECD, 2018) work task PIAAC, 32 countries
USA: 10% of jobs are susceptible. In OECD-member
countries, the extent of susceptibility is between 6%
(Norway) and 33% (Slovakia).
McKinsey Global
Institute (2017) employment
US Bureau of Labour
Statistics
At 70% probability, 26% of jobs are suseptible, and at
30% probability, 60% of jobs are very susceptible.
Employment Advisory




database (Germany) 14% of employees are very susceptible
Source: [6] (p. 7).
In this regard, it is worth noting that automation can have two effects on the work-
place. The rarer case regards when the machines completely substitute the human labour
(substitution effect), while the more usual case regards when the machines perform only
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certain subtasks. The above systemic disparity in the depth of the effects of automation on
employment may be due in part to the fact that task-based approaches are better suited to
capture this graduality. Nonetheless, we can understand that conducting these calculations
was worthwhile as they are based on the methods of a study with a remarkable interna-
tional reputation and it is vital that the subject receives more coverage in both professional
and public discourse.
5. Conclusions: Public Policy Challenges
No one can predict how technology will affect the labour market as the social effects
of technological change are heavily affected by country-specific institutional characteristics.
Even if Sweden is more vulnerable to the job-destroying impact of automation than Hun-
gary, the Swedish institutional environment is in many respects better suited to mitigate
these negative effects. In a recent research study, Warhurst et al. attempted to evaluate the
factors that can influence the effect of technological advances not only on employment but
also on the quality of working conditions [29]. A distinction was made between mediating
and contextualizing factors. The latter is a widely defined as an institutional environment
in which workplace industrial relation structures, national education and training systems,
labour law and workers’ security, and the welfare system all play important roles. Why
and how these factors can divert the social impacts of developments in individual countries
may not require any further explanation. Practices such as competitiveness strategies,
individual managerial decisions and choices, and the features of human resource manage-
ment and innovation management in addition to contextual considerations are equally
relevant in the day-to-day operations of companies. As for competitiveness strategy, for
example, it can be assumed that the same innovation will have different effects on quality
than for companies applying a cost-effectiveness-based competitiveness strategy. Among
the human resource management techniques, the methods practiced by companies for
coordination within the organization, individual and collective knowledge development,
knowledge sharing, and organizational learning deserve special attention.
In examining the management practices of French, Swedish and English companies
in aircraft manufacturing, Gautié et al. [30] found that French managers raised in the
culture of Grandes Ecoles tend to develop more formalized, technocratic, and bureaucratic
organizational structures (lean a la française) in which employees are given a theoretical
opportunity to be involved in the introduction of innovation. Although, Gautié found
that such an approach does not work well in reality. In contrast, Swedish companies tend
to actively include employees in the implementation of innovations by allowing them to
express their opinions and be involved in decision making. As a result of the discrepancies
and complex interactions between the above-mentioned intermediary and contextual
variables, the French companies surveyed have often implemented early retirement of
the elderly with the introduction of the three-dimensional CAD systems, while Swedish
companies have heavily invested in training staff using this technology, allowing older
workers to keep up with changes as dictated by technological developments.
It is also worth noting that during the “big number battle” [31] over the possible
job-destroying consequences of technological development, far less attention was given
to the effects of automation on the quality aspects of working conditions. However, in
the least, we can foresee substantial changes in this field as we can in the structure of
occupations. In workplaces where automation has no substitutional impact on human
labour, the additional effect [2016] that may affect a greater number of jobs can be expected
more than for creative destruction. Working conditions, physical workplaces, and the
content of work activities will all be drastically altered by digital technology. It would
be worthwhile to put more emphasis on this in the future to avoid massive technological
unemployment.
If one of the public policy goals is to reduce the socially disruptive effects of automa-
tion, only complex methods that simultaneously target the above-listed mediating and
contextual variables will be able to achieve this. In this regard, Hungary is not performing
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well; in the last ten years, the institutional structure of labour market security, the welfare
state, and labour relations has been gradually dismantled, while the training system has
been substantially reshaped [32]. Simultaneously, market practices have changed in an
adverse direction. According to the European Working Conditions Survey, while 44%
of workers surveyed in 2005 were employed at creative workplaces, the proportion of
workers working in creative jobs has decreased significantly (providing them with a high
degree of autonomy in addition to learning and skills development). Meanwhile, by 2015,
their market share dropped to 37%. In parallel, the proportion of Taylorian jobs with low
levels of autonomy and limited learning opportunities rose from 27% to 33% over the same
period [33] (p. 40).
In conclusion, Hungary’s institutions supporting the management of temporary labour
market conditions by further training, temporary income supplementation, and housing
mobility have declined dramatically, and businesses are increasingly relying less on one of
the most essential skills while facing job-destroying automation (i.e., creative intelligence).
As a result, the threats associated with an already elevated level of automation suscepti-
bility are more likely to materialize. Recently, Finnish researchers examined the potential
impacts of labour substituting technological development on government revenues, social
expenditures, budget balances, population-level poverty rates, and Gini coefficients for
disposable income in the EU-28 countries [34]. The authors investigated the resilience of
the EU-28 countries (including the UK) for a pessimistic and an optimistic employment
scenario. The data demonstrated that if the pessimistic scenario would become a reality
(which is closer to the methodology applied in this paper), Hungary would be among
the five most negatively impacted countries in terms of government revenue (4th) and
poverty (3rd), while in terms of the Gini-coefficient it is ranked 9th. Currently, to what
extent government initiatives such as the Digital Workforce Initiative11 and the Hungarian
Artificial Intelligence Strategy12 be able to counter these risks in the future is the concern.
As the present analysis is based on pre-pandemic conditions, another separate research
issue regards how the pandemic and its aftermath will impact automation.
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Notes
1 Valenduc and Vendramin cite mobile phones as an example of this convergence that has become astonishingly “indispensable” with
the simultaneous development of technologies that are not necessarily closely related: GPS, mobile internet, Java programming
language, and mobile applications based on it [6] (p. 4), in addition to other hardware (e.g., processors, memories, and lenses).
2 It is worth emphasizing partially overlapping concepts. In our interpretation, automation occurs when work tasks previously
performed by humans are replaced by machines including robotization when these machines are robots. Finally, digitization
refers to the conversion of analogue data to digital data. In this sense, automation is a centuries-old process in production and
services with robots as the products of the second half of the 20th century, while digitization is a novelty in recent decades. The
extent of technological and social change is caused by the interconnection of these processes.
3 Susceptibility to automation is hereinafter referred to as the probability that a certain job or occupation will be performed by
machines instead of people within a certain time interval.
4 They did so out of coercion as only the OECD-funded Adult Skills and Competence Survey and the European Working Conditions
Survey (EWCS) conducted by Eurofound in Europe allow it to occur every five years.
5 FEOR is the Hungarian Standard Classification System for Occupations (Foglalkozások Egységes Osztályozási Rendszere
in Hungarian).
6 We would like to express our gratitude for their generous support in allowing the list of occupations to be available to us, which
has greatly facilitated our work.
7 See the translation key published by the CSO (KSH): http://www.ksh.hu/docs/osztalyozasok/feor/fordkulcs_feor_isco_hu.pdf
(accessed on 4 August 2021)
8 In one case we deviated from this procedure: Two ISCO occupations were associated with the FEOR code 9310 (Simple industrial
occupations: 9311: Mining and quarrying labourers, p = 0.370; and 9329: Manufacturing labourers not elsewhere classified,
p = 0.840). In this case, in applying the dominance principle, we used the probability associated with code 9329.
9 The 2016 microcensus collected information of about 10% of the population. The large number of items thus allowed for a detailed
examination of the occupational structure. For more information on data collection, visit https://www.ksh.hu/mikrocenzus2016,
(accessed on 4 August 2021).
10 This is true even if the heavy industrialization during World War II certainly helped this process. In addition, those living in
urban poverty who moved to the suburbs often did so because new minority groups were replacing them in the urban areas.
This is sometimes called “the white flight” (We are thankful for this comment to Mark McCaffrey.)
11 https://digitalisjoletprogram.hu/files/2e/86/2e865bc650f57539da2dbccf7b169eda.pdf (accessed on 4 August 2021).
12 https://ai-hungary.com/api/v1/companies/15/files/137203/view (accessed on 4 August 2021).
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